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Democracy for All: Conceptualizing and Measuring
Egalitarian Democracy*
RACHEL SIGMAN AND STAFFAN I. LINDBERG
A lthough equality figures prominently in many foundational theories of democracy, liberaland electoral conceptions of democracy have dominated empirical political scienceresearch on topics like political regimes, democratization and democratic survival.
This paper develops the concept of egalitarian democracy as a regime that provides de facto
protection of rights and freedoms equally across the population, distributes resources in a way
that enables meaningful political participation for all citizens and fosters an environment in
which all individuals and social groups can influence political and governing processes. Using
new indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project, the paper develops and presents
measures of these important concepts, demonstrates their relationship to existing measures, and
illustrates their utility for advancing the study of democracy in ways that more fully embrace
the richness of democratic theory.
Much of the scholarship on democracy was produced in a context characterized byCold War ideologies in which freedom and equality often stood in opposition toeach other. Democracy came to be associated with capitalist societies embodying
principles of freedom, competition and self-determination. Communist societies, by contrast,
were characterized by planned economies and autocratic rule, often justified by the pursuit of
equality. It is therefore not surprising that the most widely accepted conceptions of democracy
tend to emphasize liberal principles much more than they do principles of egalitarianism. In
prominent contemporary measures of democracy, such as Freedom House and Polity IV,
democracy has become synonymous with distinctively liberal traits such as constitutional
de jure rights and constraints on executive powers.
Yet, the concept of equality occupies a central place in democratic theory. Much early
theorizing about democracy was based on the simple idea that individuals are not inherently
unequal, as aristocratic systems implied. Contemporary scholarship is increasingly attentive to
the gulf that exists between de jure democratic procedures, rights and freedoms, and the extent
to which they apply equally across citizens. Equality, moreover, figures prominently in theories
of democratic durability, effectiveness and legitimacy. Even Robert Dahl, whom many
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consider the icon of liberal theories of democracy, explicitly emphasizes the fundamental
importance of equality for the realization of pluralistic and liberal forms of democracy (Dahl
1989; Dahl 1996). Nonetheless, empirical research on democracy has remained overwhelmingly
focused on liberal conceptions of democracy. Today, accelerating levels of inequality
accompanied by growing dissatisfaction with democracy underscores the risks of neglecting the
study of the egalitarian underpinnings of democracy.
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) seeks to “bring equality back in” by recognizing—
and measuring—the egalitarian foundations of democracy.1 This paper develops the concept
of egalitarian democracy as a type of democracy in which citizens across all social groups
are equally capable of exercising their political rights and freedoms, and of influencing
political and governing processes.2 Underlying this broad principle are three main dimensions:
Equal Protection of Rights and Freedoms, Equal Distribution of Resources and Equal
Access to Power. In addition to theorizing the concept of egalitarian democracy and
justifying its necessity, we develop measures of these three dimensions, aggregate them
into an index of egalitarian democracy, and illustrate the validity and potential utility of
these measures.
The paper begins with a discussion of the importance of equality in contemporary theories
of democracy and an assessment of the extent to which existing measures capture egalitarian
concepts. We then present the methods and data used to produce measures of egalitarian
democracy. Using a variety of techniques, we conduct a battery of validation tests of
these measures. The paper concludes by outlining potential directions for research aimed at
developing a more robust body of knowledge about egalitarian forms of democracy and
the potential contribution to our broader understanding of democratic polities.
THE CONCEPT OF EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY
The importance of egalitarianism in democratic theory arises, in part, out of the distinction
between democratic forms of government and aristocratic ones. Describing democracy as “an
absence of class government [and] the indication of a social condition where a political privilege
belongs to no one class as opposed to the whole community,” Bernstein (1961, 21) suggests that
the defining property of democracy is equality, particularly as it relates to the right or privilege
to govern. This negative definition of democracy (the absence of class government) is, likewise,
integral to contemporary theories of democracy that emphasize self-rule, pluralism and
representation. As Dahl (1989, 164–75) reminds us, self government is not merely procedural
but constitutes substantive power-sharing in itself, thus requiring “intrinsic equality”—the belief
that all beings are equally suited to rule.
Liberal theories of democracy tend to emphasize the importance of legal protection of
individual freedoms, competitive elections and constraints on rulers. Although the classical
liberalists challenged aristocratic views of a privileged ruling class, they did not necessarily see
equality as a necessary component of “civil” government. In The Second Treatise, for example,
Locke (2016 [1689]) suggests that while all individuals have natural rights to common property,
inequalities were justified by the idea that one’s own property was principally the result
1 V-Dem views egalitarian democracy as one of five main varieties of democracy. For a full account of
V-Dem’s typology, see Coppedge et al. (Coppedge et al. 2016c; Coppedge et al. 2016d).
2 We recognize debates about the extent to which scholars should, or should not, develop various conceptual
types and subtypes of democracy (i.e., Collier and Levitsky 1997; Collier and Adcock 1999; Munck and
Verkuilen 2002). We seek, simply, to provide researchers with the flexibility to conduct empirical work on
democracy in a way that recognizes the importance of equality in democratic theory.
























































































































of unequal values of labor.3 Liberal democracy does not, therefore require equality per se,
but rather the protection of inequalities that were seen as a “natural” part of society. This
perspective has formed the basis of the liberal perspective that inequality, particularly economic
inequality, is not fundamentally inimical to democracy.
The classical liberal perspective, however, is challenged by contemporary theoretical and
empirical work. Most notable in this regard is Rawls, whose focus on the “original position”
implies that existing inequalities—economic or otherwise—are likely to undermine the ability
of poorer or marginalized populations to participate meaningfully in self-rule. To address this
problem, Rawls develops a set of principles that seek to ensure equal basic liberties and fair
equality of opportunity (FEO). The latter, in particular, holds that all individuals with equivalent
talent and effort ought to have similar real opportunities to hold positions of influence. The
principle of FEO requires that all advantages given by social group, class, status or economic
position are offset in the political process, thereby ensuring that people are equally capable of
effectively shaping the rules that govern their society (Rawls 2005). The underlying logic of
this approach is that material and immaterial inequalities can fundamentally inhibit the actual
exercise of formal rights and liberties, and compromise the extent to which a democratic
polity achieves “rule by the people.”4
As Dahl notes, de jure forms of equality are usually insufficient for citizens to truly “believe
that no single member, and no minority of members, is so definitely better qualified to rule that
the one or the few should be permitted to rule over the entire association” (1989, 31). This
“strong principle of equality,” Dahl argues, ensures that “when binding decisions are made, no
citizens’ claims as to the laws, rules and policies to be adopted are to be counted as superior to
the claims of any other citizen” (1989, 105), thereby lending both legitimacy and a sense
of effectiveness to democratic institutions. Whereas the liberal perspective emphasizes legal
provisions for political participation such as suffrage, party organization and contested
elections, the egalitarian perspective emphasizes the actual provision of rights and freedoms as
it relates to the ability for the polity to exercise sovereign discretion to rule over itself.5
In addition to the uneven provision of rights and freedoms, economic or distributional
inequalities can also impede democracy. Aristotle, for instance, famously argued that only in
contexts where “few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which
the mass of the population intelligently participates in politics and develops the self-restraint
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (Lipset 1981, 31).
Dahl (1989) echoes this concern, noting that large levels of inequality are likely to undermine the
strong principle of equality since the wealthy would tend to see the poor as unfit to rule. Pateman’s
(1988) description of inequality surrounding the “sexual contract” is one such example of this type
of limitation. By engaging in a contract, tacit or otherwise, that subverts their economic power,
women can be limited in their abilities to participate in socio-political contracts.
The relationship between economic and political inequalities is of particular importance when
assessing the prospects for achieving the “strong principle.” For Walzer, the key to achieving
greater equality in society is by ensuring what he calls “complex equality,” or the idea that
inequality does not overlap across political and economic spheres. Where inequalities exist
3 See, especially, Chapter V of The Second Treatise.
4 Note that, in contrasting liberal and egalitarian views of democracy, our intention is not to create new
“subtypes” of democracy that can be found in specific places in the world as is the case, for instance, with
concepts like “delegative democracy” (O’Donell 1994) or “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997). Instead, we
suggest that egalitarian (and liberal) principles are central to the concept of democracy and researchers should
have the tools necessary to assess the extent to which countries realize these principles.
5 See, also, Ake (2000) on this point.
























































































































along socioeconomic lines, one way to advance the “strong principle” is to redistribute in such
a way that “redraws the line between politics and economics” resulting in a strengthened
“sphere of politics” that is capable of mitigating the ill effects of economic inequality (Walzer
1983, 122). In this sense, the egalitarian principle is clearly distinct from the liberal perspective,
as it sees the “natural” approach to equality of opportunity as insufficient to produce conditions
in which all citizens can properly engage in self-rule.
Regarding legitimacy in particular, equality minimizes the “resentments and frustrations” of
some groups in society (Dahl 1971, 82), thereby leading to greater overall acceptance of the
system in place. If some groups are, in practice, denied access to political and governing
processes, the legitimacy of the system is likely to remain in question (Lipset 1959, 89). Cross-
national analysis lends support to the idea that the decision to participate in the political system is
itself an expression of legitimacy for that system (Anderson and Barimendi 2008, 290). When
Dahl’s “strong principle” is achieved, and individuals recognize their fellow citizens as capable of
effectively governing society, a legitimate system of self-rule becomes more feasible.6 Related to
this point is De Tocqueville’s view that associations based on horizontal (equal) ties support
effective democratic rule in a way that less equal, vertical ties do not. To the extent that
governments protect and enable such ties, they foster the means necessary to make their polities
more responsive and legitimate, no matter what formal democratic institutions might be in place.7
Effectiveness and legitimacy, both supported by equality and participation, can be mutually
reinforcing in such a way that further strengthens democracy. The principle of egalitarian
democracy must therefore address the ways in which equal participation becomes both possible
and productive. We identify three dimensions, or “subcomponents,” that relate closely to this
perspective.8 First, we focus on the provision or deprivation of de facto rights for all citizens, or
what we call Equal Protection. Second, we focus on Equal Distribution, or the extent to which
the government ensures that the entire population enjoys the basic necessities that enable them
to participate in political and governing processes. We also identify a third principle relating to
Equal Access emphasizing the de facto distribution of power in society. We describe these three
subcomponents in the following sections.
Equal Protection Of Rights And Freedoms
Equal Protection implies that the state grants and actively protects rights and freedoms
evenly across the population, such that all citizens are free to engage in the political process.9
6 As Dahl (1971, 89–91) argues, however, democratic regimes can in many cases tolerate high levels of
inequality by granting only small political concessions to marginalized populations. This observation is
consistent with those, such as Brennan (2016, 118) who view the relationship between democracy and equality as
potentially problematic. This problem is exacerbated when, as is often the case, citizens are not well informed on
most issues. While we recognize this issue as a potential challenge to the idea of egalitarian democracy, our
conceptualization seeks to overcome it by recognizing the importance of equal distribution of resources, like
education, that help citizens to become better informed and more capable of participation.
7 More specifically, we believe that the mechanisms of effectiveness cited here can improve democratic
governance in both consensual and majoritarian systems, despite the fact that these systems may produce
different patterns of government (Lijphart 1999).
8 Following V-Dem’s conceptual structure, we use the term subcomponent to describe the three main
concepts forming the basis of the egalitarian “component” of democracy. The structure of concepts and measures
is described in more detail below.
9 Note that low levels of equal protection are also relevant to contexts where the definition of citizenship is
severely restricted, thereby excluding large groups of people from enjoying an array of rights and freedoms. As
Cohen (2009) notes, this can also take the form of partial rights and freedoms or what she terms
“semi-citizenship.”
























































































































Whereas the liberal doctrine tends to focus on formally codified political rights and civil
liberties, the Equal Protection subcomponent focuses instead on the effective enjoyment of
those rights and freedoms across the populace. Equality, as Rousseau declared, is seen as
necessary because “liberty cannot subsist without it” (1920, 170). Beetham summarizes this
principle when he states that “all adult members … should have an equal right to have their
voices heard, and be given equal consideration in the formulation of public policy” (1999, 282).
To achieve Equal Protection of Rights And Freedoms, the state must also take action to ensure
that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of others, echoing
arguments by Bernstein (1961), Beetham (1999), Pitkin (2004) among others, that the liberal
emphasis on formal or constitutional provision of rights is not enough.
There are myriad ways that rights and freedoms could be unequally applied across social
groups. Historically, political or civil rights have often been extended selectively extended
to certain social groups such as property owners, men, religious groups, and so on. It is not
uncommon that some groups are denied civil liberties such as the right to contest political office,
form political parties or freely express their views. These conditions have occurred quite
frequently in the history of democracies, such as in the denial of voting rights to slaves and
women. Our measure of Equal Protection thus includes two indicators measuring the extent to
which civil liberties and political rights are protected equally across citizens. A third indicator
measures the percent of the population whose civil liberties are effectively protected.10
Equal Distribution of Resources
The literature on equality and democracy suggests that a more Equal Distribution of Resources
across social groups is also necessary to achieve political equality.11 Lower poverty rates and
guarantees of basic goods and services, such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare,
ensure that all individuals are physically capable of participating (Saward 1998; Beetham 1999;
Sen 2001). For example, if citizens are denied healthcare in a way that leads to sickness or even
death, they are effectively prohibited from exercising the right to vote or express themselves.
Likewise, lack of high-quality basic education impairs an individual’s capability to be a political
equal (Dewey 2004 [1916]).
In addition, high levels of social or economic inequalities can easily translate into political
inequalities (Sinclair 1962; Dahl 2006). Sen, for example, notes that “relative deprivation in
terms of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in terms of capabilities,” and “in a generally
opulent country, more income is needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social
functioning” (2001, 89). Thus, Sen not only warns against the potential for overlapping spheres
of inequality, but suggests that these particular inequalities are not likely to abate as countries
grow or transform their economies.
Where high levels of resource inequality exist, moreover, relationships of dependence, such
as patron–client ties, are likely to proliferate. Such relationships hold the potential to inhibit
meaningful participation of the poor. Describing agrarian societies in the developing world, for
instance, Scott (1977) explains that a certain basic level of resources is necessary to avoid a
“profound loss of standing within the community” which can bring about a “permanent
situation of dependence” that increases the likelihood of coercion in political decisions (9).
10 There are other indicators in the V-Dem dataset that relate to this concept. To avoid overlap with V-Dem’s
other “high-level indices,” however, we purposefully do not include some of these indicators. A more detailed
discussion of the data and methods is provided below.
11 See, for example, Berman (2006), Bernstein (1961), Dahl (1989), Dworkin (1987), Miller and Walzer
(1995).
























































































































As Stokes et al. conclude, the contingent distribution of basic resources in exchange for votes
provides an opportunity for powerful patrons to “blunt elections as instruments for holding
governments to account and for communicating the distribution of voters’ preferences” (2013, 13).
In other words, a system of self-rule requires a certain level of equality in the distribution of
resources. An egalitarian democracy must ensure (a) that no individual is so impoverished as to
preclude their participation; and (b) that the distribution of resources is not so unequal as to give
rise to relationships of dependence or coercion that undermine individual autonomy. The Equal
Distribution subcomponent thus comprises both positive and negative conceptions of freedom
that are necessary for a working democracy.
Equal Access to Power
The third dimension of egalitarian democracy is based on the idea that neither the protections of
rights and freedoms nor the Equal Distribution of Resources is sufficient to ensure adequate
representation.12 Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal de facto capabilities to participate; to
serve in positions of political power; to put issues on the agenda; and to influence policymaking.
Arguably, if all groups and individuals are equally capable of participating in these ways, power
should be distributed relatively equally in society. We focus in particular on Equal Access to
Power by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.13
Do Existing Democracy Indices Measure Egalitarianism?
Before moving on to describe the specific data and methods used to measure egalitarian democ-
racy, we briefly explore the extent to which the most commonly used democracy indices—those
produced by Freedom House and Polity—capture the egalitarian principles described in this
section. In Figure 1(a) we compare Freedom House’s Civil Liberties Index to V-Dem indicators
measuring the extent to which civil liberties are protected equally across the population.14 It is





1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Civil Liberties Across Social Groups (V-Dem)
Civil Liberties Across Socio-Economic Class (V-Dem)







1945 1960 1975 1990 2005
Power Distributed by Social Group (V-Dem)
Power Distributed by Gender (V-Dem)
Polity2 (0-1 scale)
Fig. 1. Egalitarianism in existing democracy measures
12 See, for example, Mansbridge (1983), Pateman (1988), Rawls (2005), Berman (2006), Bernstein (1961).
Dworkin (1987), Miller and Walzer (1995).
13 The latter is a broad term involving ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, sexual identity, regional origin
or other ascriptive characteristics.
14 All variables are transformed to a 0–1 scale and we reverse civil liberties such that higher scores indicate
higher levels of civil liberties. All countries for which there are observations in both data sets are included for the
years covering 1972–2012.
























































































































the indicators measuring the extent to which civil liberties are protected across socioeconomic and
social groups, suggesting that the extension of formal rights is not necessarily synonymous with the
Equal Protection of those rights.
In Figure 1 we also look at the relationship between the Polity2 index (Marshall and Jaggers
2015), which measures procedural elements of democracy such as competition and participation,
and V-Dem indicators measuring the distribution of power by gender and social groups. Again,
movement in the Polity2 measure does not follow the same trajectory as the power distribution
indicators. Specifically, the large increase in openness during the Third Wave transitions as
measured by Polity are not reflected in the power distribution measures. Together, the two graphs
suggest that existing indices do not appear to sufficiently capture egalitarian principles, and that
new measures to counter-balance the liberal and electoral perspectives are warranted.
CONSTRUCTING MEASURES OF EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY
With an emphasis on de facto protections of rights and freedoms, distribution and actual access
to power, the availability of data sources to measure egalitarian democracy have, until recently,
been somewhat limited. The V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016b) includes measures derived
from expert survey data of both de jure and de facto aspects of political regimes, thus helping to
overcome this problem and develop indices measuring the egalitarian principles outlined above.
Specifically, we use ten V-Dem indicators to construct measures of the three subcomponents:
Equal Protection of Rights and Freedoms, Equal Distribution of Reources and Equal Access to
Power. We then combine these three measure to form an “Egalitarian Component index.”
Finally, because the Egalitarian Component alone does not necessarily encompass the basic
requirements of democracy, we combine it with V-Dem’s index for Electoral Democracy to
form the highest level of measurement: the Egalitaraian Democracy index. This last step follows
V-Dem conventions for measuring other “high-level” principles of democracy, such as Liberal,
Participatory and Deliberative democracy.15
Several goals guide the selection of indicators and construction of indices. First, we select
indicators for the Equal Protection, Equal Access and Equal Distribution subcomponents that do
not appear in V-Dem’s other main indices of democracy. This ensures that we can, to the extent
possible, study relationships between different forms of democracy. Second, we construct each
subcomponent to capture the relevant theoretical dimensions of egalitarianism in a way that is
both coherent and conceptually distinct from other concepts of interest, while at the same time
aspiring toward unidimensionality in each subcomponent.
Starting with the conceptual logic outlined above, we identify individual indicators that relate
closely to each subcomponent.16 We then employ a Bayesian factor analysis (BFA) to estimate
15 The V-Dem dataset offers data for some 350 indicators of democracy for 173 countries from 1900 to 2012
based on ratings provided by over 2500 country experts. For details on expert coders, their recruitment and
management, see Coppedge et al. (2016a). V-Dem’s approach to developing indicators of hard-to-measure concepts
involves several safeguards that aim to ensure both validity and reliability. First, V-Dem employs coders with
expertise in the particular country and substantive area (i.e., legislatures, executive, civil liberties) for which they are
being asked to code. Second, for each country and indicator, V-Dem seeks at least five experts with diverse
backgrounds, including those who were born in or currently live in that country. Third, V-Dem has developed a
state-of-the-art measurement model to aggregate coder ratings from the five experts for each data point. The model
uses a Bayesian ordinal item-response model providing a high degree of cross-country and cross-time comparability
and estimates of uncertainty associated with each data point (Pemstein et al. 2016). Details of each indicator can be
found in the V-Dem Version 6 (Coppedge et al. 2016c). See also, V-Dem Methodology (Coppedge et al. 2016a).
16 As a preliminary test of coherence, we use a basic principal components analysis (PCA) to test whether the
indicators load onto single or multiple factors. For all three subcomponents only one factor was retained from the PCA.
























































































































a single latent dimension for each subcomponent. As described in Coppedge et al. (2016a), we
randomly select 100 draws from each indicator variable’s posterior distribution, and use a
unidimensional normal theory BFA to measure the latent concept sequentially for each ran-
domly selected draw in each grouping of variables. We then combine the posterior distributions
of the latent factor scores in each variable group to yield the latent factor scores. One distinct
advantage of this method is that it produces confidence intervals for each estimate, taking rater
accountability and uncertainty into account.
Subcomponent Indices
Equal Protection of Rights and Freedoms. The Equal Protection index utilizes indicators
listed in Table 1 aimed at measuring respect for civil liberties across socioeconomic classes and
other social groups (including e.g., race, ethnicity, religion), as well as the extent to which such
rights are protected equally across the country’s entire population. The two indicators measuring
protection of civil liberties use the V-Dem measurement model output which is scaled from
approximately −3 to 3. The indicator measuring the percent of population with weaker civil
liberties is a continuous measure scaled from 0 to 100 that uses bootstrapping to aggregate
multiple coder ratings in a way that maximizes reliability and comparability.
Equal Distribution of key resources. The Equal Distribution subcomponent employs
four V-Dem indicators capturing both the extent to which basic resources are provided
by the government and the extent to which these resources are distributed equally among
the population. First, we include an indicator measuring the extent to which the public programs
are designed and administered in a targeted and particularistic way. This measure also
relates to clientelism, tapping into unequal relationships of dependence. Second, we use
V-Dem’s indicator that measures whether welfare policies are means-tested or applied
universally. This measure helps to identify the extent to government programs are making
sure all citizens enjoy the basic goods and services necessary to participate in democratic
processes. The final two measures we include are measures of the extent to which health
and education services are distributed equally among the population. Point estimates for all
TABLE 1 Loadings and Uniqueness Scores of Constituent Indicatorsa
Indicators λ ψ
Equal Protection
Social class equality in respect for civil liberties 0.930 0.135
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.793 0.371
Weaker civil liberties population (reversed) 0.598 0.642
Equal Distribution
Particularistic or public goods 0.651 0.578
Universalistic welfare 0.637 0.596
Educational equality 0.834 0.307
Health equality 0.848 0.283
Equal Access
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.863 0.254
Power distributed by social group 0.816 0.334
Power distributed by gender 0.815 0.336
Note: a(λ)’s and (ψ)’s provided by the V-Dem data team.
See footnote no. 23 and Coppedge et al. (2016c, 439) for more detail.
























































































































four indicators are measured using measurement model output that range from approximately
−3 to 3.
Equal Access to power. Finally, the Equal Access subcomponent measures power distribution
by socioeconomic position, social group and gender. As described above, we include these
measures as a way to capture the extent to which typically disadvantaged social groups are
capable of influencing their polity’s political and governing processes. The power distribution
measures specifically ask experts to rate the extent to which economic wealth, membership in a
particular social group or gender are translated into political power. Where these attributes
translate strongly into power, opportunities for access and influence will be greater.17
The Egalitarian Component and Democracy Indices
We combine the Equal Protection, Equal Distribution and Equal Access subcomponent indices
to form the Egalitarian Component. As discussed in Coppedge et al. (2016d), if dimensions of
a concept are viewed as necessary conditions, a multiplicative aggregation would be most
appropriate. If they are substitutable, an additive approach should be used. Given that all three
of our subcomponents are to some extent necessary, but that strength on one dimension is
a higher achievement of egalitarianism than none, we aggregate using the mean of the three
subcomponents. This approach acknowledges that countries scoring high on one dimension but
lower on another should still be considered as more closely embodying the principle of
egalitarianism. This approach also puts a premium on countries that are strong on all three
dimensions. It should also be emphasized that the Egalitarian Component does not measure
egalitarian democracy but measures egalitarianism across different regime types.
Finally, we combine the Egalitarian Component index with the Electoral Democracy index
(Teorell et al. 2016) to form the Egalitarian Democracy index.18 There can be no democracy
without elections, but there is wide recognition that democracy is more than just elections. We
therefore combine the score for V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy index (also sometimes called
the Polyarchy index) with the score for the Egalitarian Component using the aggregation
formula developed by V-Dem’s research group for other democracy indices, described in
Appendix A, where we also provide descriptive statistics for the indices. All indices are scaled
between 0 and 1.
UNDERSTANDING THE INDICES
Since there are few, if any, extant measures of egalitarian democracy, validation is not
necessarily a straightforward matter. To the extent possible, we follow the guidance of Adcock
and Collier (2001), Seawright and Collier (2014) and Gerring (2011) prescribing content, face
and convergent/discriminant validation methods, each of which “provides one kind of evidence
to be integrated into an overall process of assessment” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 543).19 Our
approach to validation specifically addresses the possibility of systematic measurement error
17 Descriptive statistics for all indicators are provided in Table 1 in Appendix A.
18 See Coppedge et al. (2016d) for more discussion of this approach. The indices developed here have since
replaced those from previous versions.
19 This paper does not include a fourth type of test—nomological validation—testing theorized relationships
involving the systematized concept of interest (Adcock and Collier 2001, 542). Given that the concept of
egalitarian democracy, as described above, has not figured prominently in recent empirical research on
democracy, there is little opportunity for nomological validation.
























































































































that would weaken confidence not only in the measures themselves, but in their theorized
relationships with other concepts of interest (Gerring 2011, 159).20
Content Validation
Content validation includes an assessment of whether or not the appropriate conceptual
elements are included, as well as the extent to which inappropriate elements are not included
(Adcock and Collier 2001, 538). It is especially important to assess content validation for
measures produced using a latent variable approach given the uncertainty involved in assuming
the existence of an underlying latent trait within a set of observed indicators. We do so by first
examining the loadings and uniqueness scores of constituent indicators with respect to the three
subcomponent indices. These basic statistics give us a sense of what is, and is not, most closely
related to the latent variables generated by the BFA and in the aggregation of the subcomponent
and component indices.
We then examine content validity by decomposing variance in V-Dem’s coder-level data. For
the content to be valid, Bollen and Jackman (1989) argues, there must be some level of
agreement about the concepts being investigated. We test for agreement by analyzing variance
components in coder ratings across the indices and constituent indicators.21 Employed by
Martinez i Coma and Van Ham (2015) for the Electoral Integrity Project, by Steenbergen and
Marks (2007) for the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and by McMann et al. (2016) and Lindberg
et al. (2014) for other V-Dem indices, this method assumes that coder disagreement may signal
lack of common understanding about underlying concepts.22
Relationships to constituent indicators. We examine the loadings and uniqueness scores
resulting from the BFA used to produce the Equal Protection, Equal Distribution and Equal
Access subcomponent indices (Table 1). Point estimates of the loadings (λ) are provided for
each indicator and subcomponent. The uniqueness scores (ψ) represent the proportion of the
variance in the particular indicator that is not explained by the latent subcomponent variable.23
Thus, a higher value of uniqueness suggests that the indicator is less strongly related to the
latent construct. The latent Equal Protection variable predicts a larger proportion of variance
for the indicators measuring social class equality in respect for civil liberties than it does for
social group equality. Not surprisingly, the uniqueness score for the variable “percentage of
20 Note that we focus exclusively on validity in this paper, rather than on reliability relating to random
(stochastic) error. Given that V-Dem’s processes of data generation are specifically designed to minimize random
error, and that the indicators include confidence intervals with the explicit purpose of providing information
about reliability, we refer readers to V-Dem’s reference materials, available at https://v-dem.net/en/reference/
version-6-mar-2016/
21 In the Online Appendix Section B, we also provide common measures of inter-rater agreement including
unweighted and weighted versions of Cohen’s κ statistics and Krippendorf’s α.
22 Typically, coder-level disagreement is viewed as an issue of reliability. Since the V-Dem measurement
model addresses common inter-rater reliability issues such as differential item functioning and inconsistent rank
ordering (Pemstein et al. 2016), we confine our discussion of coder-level variance as a way of detecting the
potential for underlying conceptual issues.
23 λs for each indicator were provided by the V-Dem data team. They are obtained using the MCMCfactanal
command analyzing posterior statistics in the MCMCpack in R (Martin, Quinn and Park 2016). Uniqueness
scores ψ can be found in the V-Dem’s reference document entitled “Structure of V-Dem’s Indices, Components
and Indicators” which accompanies each release of the V-Dem data (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2016). The
uniqueness scores appearing in this document will be slightly different from those contained in Table 1 because
the V-Dem v7 dataset includes updated data that was not available at the time of writing.
























































































































population with weaker civil liberties” is higher, at 0.642, because there is naturally more
variance in a variable scaled from 0 to 100 than in the other variables measured on an ordinal
four-point scale. In the Equal Distribution subcomponent, ~ 70 percent of variance in the health
and education inequality variables is predicted by the latent variable while the same can be said
for 40–43 percent of variance in the other indicators. The Equal Access variable appears slightly
more coherent as the resulting latent variable predicts 67–75 percent of variance in all three
constituent indicators. Overall, the uniqueness patterns appear to suggest that the subcomponent
indices are particularly sensitive to socioeconomic disparities, such as when poorer segments
of the population are denied civil liberties, or when there is inequality in the provision of
healthcare or education.24
Coder agreement. Variance decomposition is an increasingly popular tool to evaluate validity
of expert survey data because it assesses coder agreement relative to other sources of variance in
the data. Following Steenbergen and Marks (2007), Martinez i Coma and Van Ham (2015),
Lindberg et al. (2014), McMann et al. (2016), we use multi-level models without predictors to
generate estimates of the variance that is attributable to coder-level disagreement for each
indicator. Specifically, we analyze variance components at the coder and indicator (survey
question) level to assess the overall proportion of variance in coder ratings attributable to coder
disagreement across country-years.25
In Table 2 we test if the coder-level variance component is statistically significant and
compare its levels across indicators, thus estimating which indicators produce more or less
disagreement in ratings. We would expect, for instance, to see relatively larger coder-level
variance on indicators that measure more abstract concepts or phenomena that are more
complex and thus harder to rate uniformly.26
For each indicator, Table 1 provides average coder-level deviations from the grand mean of
ratings for each country-year. While there is a statistically significant (p< 0.001) variance for all
indicators, no indicator contains a coder-level variance component of >0.075, indicating a
TABLE 2 Coder Disagreement by Indicator
Indicators Coder Effects SE Coders Observation
Social class equality in civil liberties 0.058* 0.003 1070 70,698
Social group equality in civil liberties 0.074* 0.003 1178 85,923
Weaker civil liberties (% of population) 0.065* 0.003 828 51,948
Particularistic or public goods 0.051* 0.002 1138 82,823
Welfare policies universal 0.065* 0.003 1137 82,847
Educational equality 0.047* 0.002 1145 83,059
Health equality 0.044* 0.002 1133 82,439
Power distribution by socioeconomic group 0.042* 0.002 1150 83,063
Power distribution by social group 0.049* 0.002 1139 82,869
Power distribution by gender 0.037* 0.002 1147 83,425
Note: *p< 0.01.
24 In the Online Appendix Section B, we provide correlation coefficients examining relationships between the
indicators and indices.
25 Levels of coder disagreement can also signal random error (reliability) issues such as differential item
functioning. As mentioned above, we refer readers to Pemstein et al. (2016) for an account of how V-Dem
addresses these issues in aggregating ordinal coder ratings.
26 For all models, we standardize indicator ratings on a scale from 0–1, employ fixed effects for country and
year variation and random effects for each coder.
























































































































rather minimal coder-level effect. Coder-level variance components are highest in the variables
measuring respect for civil liberties across different groups and the extent to which welfare
policies are universal. The higher levels of disagreement in these variables are not surprising
given the difficulty of observing respect for civil liberties across subgroups, as well as the
complex and multi-faceted nature of welfare policy in many countries. Overall, these results
are comforting in that the proportion of variance attributable to coder disagreement is not
exceedingly large.27
While more could be done to analyze coding patterns of specific indicators, the variance
components presented here suggest that overall levels of coder disagreement are of small
magnitudes given the types of coding tasks asked of V-Dem experts. Moreover, this brief
analysis shows that coding patterns vary in ways that might be expected based on both the
observability of the phenomenon and coder characteristics.
Face Validity
We also examine face validity: the extent to which the indices match our knowledge of
particular cases both across countries and over time. First, we examine relationships between
country scores on particular indices. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the Egalitarian
Component index and V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy index averaged over the period
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Electoral Democracy (Polyarchy)
Fig. 2. Scatter plot: electoral democracy versus egalitarian component 1990–2012
27 In the Online Appendix (Section B), we provide a pooled analysis of index-level variance as well as an
assessment of the types of coder characteristics that may systematically affect ratings.
























































































































Democracy index and thus provide a general picture of how the egalitarian principles outlined
above relate to the basic procedural expression of democracy.
At lower levels of electoral democracy we find countries like Cuba, Bhutan and Vietnam well
above the best-fit line reflecting higher-than-average scores on the egalitarian component. Well
below the best-fit line are countries like Angola, Yemen and South Sudan. Given the systematic
deprivation of both rights and resources in these countries, their placement seems plausible. At
high levels of electoral democracy Northern European countries and Taiwan are found above
the best-fit line while countries like the United States, Chile and Brazil are, as expected, found
below the best-fit line. Given the emphasis on liberal political and economic principles in the
Western Hemisphere since the 1980s, these placements also seem to make intuitive sense. That
variation is highest at low and medium levels of democracy is also encouraging, as this indicates
an underlying relationship between democracy and egalitarianism that is consistent with the
theoretical approach described above.28
We also examine a few specific country cases in more detail to assess whether or not the
variables change over time as we might expect. To do so, we select an array of “extreme” cases
whose scores should, for the most part, be predictable and uncontroversial. Figure 3 shows time
trends in the Egalitarian Democracy index for four countries that we would expect to vary both
cross-nationally and over time. As expected, Sweden shows the highest scores throughout the
entire time period, with increases in the 1920s and again in the mid-1970s, the latter reflecting
adoption of a new constitution and broad extension of social welfare policies such as free
childcare. In Chile we see increasing levels of egalitarian democracy until Pinochet takes power
in 1973 when a precipitous drop takes place in all dimensions of the index following the
introduction of political repression and neoliberal reforms. Cuba and Nigeria, both under
autocratic rule for most of the 20th century show consistently low scores, with Cuba scoring
somewhat higher thanks to their relatively Equal Distribution of Resources. Nigeria climbs
considerably following elections in 1999, though Equal Access to Power and Equal Distribution
of Resources keeps Nigeria relatively low in recent decades. With expected increases in
electoral democracy scores resulting from successful elections in 2011–2015, we would expect
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Fig. 3. Egalitarian democracy over time in four countries
28 In the Online Appendix, Section C we provide additional plots depicting the relationships between the
subcomponents.
























































































































remain somewhat low relative to other democracies. Time trends for the United States are
provided in in the Online Appendix, Section C.
Attention to these specific cases demonstrates the potential utility of the four indices in
capturing relevant variation—both across countries and over time—in a wide variety of
countries. Though the cases of Nigeria and Cuba illustrate the potential difficulty of using the
Egalitarian Democracy Index to distinguish between a democracy with unequal distributions of
resources and/or access to power and an autocratic country with relatively Equal Distributions
of Resources or Access to Power, the lower level indices help researchers to overcome
this problem. Additionally, the case of the United States illustrates that the Equal Protection
component may not always capture all relevant change in the extension of rights and freedoms,
specifically as it relates to voting rights. Overall, however, we believe that the movements
across a variety of cases merit a sufficiently high level of confidence that the indices, in general,
capture what we know about particular cases.
Convergent/Discriminant Validation
The purpose of convergent/discriminant validation is to assess the extent to which the new
measures relate to alternative indicators of the systematized concept of interest (Adcock and
Collier 2001, 540). Given that, to our knowledge, no cross-country time-series measures of
egalitarian democracy exist, we assess convergence with related concepts. We also examine
relationships with concepts with which egalitarian democracy should not relate, with the
expectation that relationships will be of medium strength or negative. Tables 8 and 9 provided
in the Online Appendix Section D, summarize these relationships. We find that correlations
with other V-Dem indices tend to fall in the 0.6–0.8 range and vary in expected ways. There is
also a clear distinction between common measures of rights and freedoms and the egalitarian
indices, thereby suggesting that the egalitarian indices achieve meaningful distinction from
conventional measures of liberal democracy.
We draw several important lessons from this series of tests including content, case and
convergent/discriminant methods of validation. First, we are generally confident that the
measures as currently constructed capture the theorized concept of egalitarian democracy and its
underlying principles. Second, while Equal Protection and Equal Distribution both measure
conditions that may enable participation, it is clear from the tests that Equal Access is, to a
greater extent, a measure of whether various groups are actually able to reap the benefits of
participation meaningful in the political system.
Additional work may be necessary to build more comprehensive subcomponents, especially
to measure the Equal Protection of rights and liberties across various types of groups, such as
workers. Moreover, the analysis of coder disagreement suggests that Equal Protection of rights
may be more difficult than the other concepts to measure with expert survey data, suggesting the
need to further examine the best ways to understand how rights and freedoms are (or are not)
protected across various groups in society. This last point also suggests the need to further
explore the strengths and weaknesses of expert survey data to measure de facto political
phenomena, given that it can be difficult to observe these phenomena directly, and that the
ability to produce consistent expert coded data may vary across different topics and units
of analysis.29
29 This point is made by Lindstadt, Proksch and Slapin (2015) in their critique of the use of expert survey data
to measure party positions.

























































































































We conclude the paper by suggesting a number of ways in which the development of these five
indices can advance existing research. Naturally, the brevity of the outline makes it incomplete.
Yet, two areas may be viewed as particularly conducive to advancement using the measures
developed and presented here: the study of global trends in the egalitarian nature of polities and
the relationship between equality/inequality and democratic survival.
Figure 4 shows global trends in the four egalitarian indices from 1900 to 2012. The
convergence among the indices following World War II is particularly striking as Equal
Distribution and Equal Access rise to meet and surpass levels of Equal Protection. Additionally,
we see a spurt of growth in all indices corresponding to the “Third Wave” of democratization at
the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. While one might assume that the fall of communism
during this time would lead to less Equal Distributions of Resources, the Equal Distribution
subcomponent appears to move in close tandem with Equal Access. A more complete inquiry
into these trajectories would help to deepen our knowledge about the underlying dynamics of
egalitarian democracy.
A second area of potential contribution relates to the expanding body of empirical research on
the relationship between inequality and democracy (i.e., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson
2006; Ansell and Samuels 2015) that provides mounting evidence that high levels of inequality
threaten both the survival and quality of democracy. Not only would V-Dem’s egalitarian
indices enable researchers to better grasp the inequality dynamics that shape the probability of
authoritarian reversals, but they could also provide insight into the particular institutional
mechanisms that shape the participatory patterns of the poor or otherwise marginalized popu-
lations in ways that could potentially undermine democratic stability. The idea here would be to
bring closer together literature on the relationship between inequality and participation, for
example, by Uslaner and Brown (2005), with research on the relationship between inequality
and democratic survival. This area of research is especially important given recent observations
of anti-democratic trends (Foa and Mounk 2016) accompanied by rhetorics of economic and
political inequality.
Ultimately, these areas of potential research are just a small fraction of the types of
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Fig. 4. Global trends in egalitarian indices
























































































































systematically measure the egalitarian underpinnings of democratic regimes. This paper points
not only to the effectiveness and utility of developing such indices, but also to the potential
benefits from further work to improve these indices and explore their range of capabilities.
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